INTRODUCTION
In a situation of tacit collusion firms rationally coordinate their commercial policies in such manner that their conduct closely resembles a cartel. 261 Yet, their decision to mimic the others' commercial policy is not the result of any agreement whatsoever. It stems from a range of market-specific features which the market players must accept as a given (oligopolistic market concentration, transparency, barriers to entry, etc.). 262 In European Union ("EU") law parlance, firms involved in a situation of tacit collusion are said to enjoy a "collective dominant position".
Over the past two decades, the European Commission ("the Commission") has adopted a stance whereby the implementation of ex ante, structural merger rules is deemed more appropriate when seeking to challenge collective dominant positions than ex post, behavioural instruments (e.g. on the basis of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU ("TFEU"). As a result, the EU merger regulation 263 ("EUMR") is the preferred, if not sole, legal tool deployed by the Commission in order to address risks of tacit collusion. 264 Since the entry into force of the EUMR, the number of Commission decisions in which the future emergence of risks of collective dominance was examined lies in the region of 130. 265 In stark contrast, and despite pronouncements of the General Court ("GC", or the Court) that Article 102 TFEU may apply to tacit collusion, the Commission has not yet taken a single decision enforcing this particular provision against tacitly collusive oligopolies. 266 Similarly, the silence of the 2009 Guidance Communication on Enforcement Priorities 267 on this issue implicitly confirms the Commission's reluctance to rely on abuse of dominance rules to address tacit collusion. 268 Overall, within the realm of EU competition law, the EUMR can thus be said to enjoy a de facto jurisdictional monopoly over collective dominance issues. The present article challenges the conventional view that tacit collusion should be exclusively addressed through the use of the EUMR. 269 To this end, it examines and seeks to set straight five possible misconceptions on which such view seems to be based. 
THE EUMR IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAN OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS WHICH ADDRESS COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE CONCERNS THROUGH A PUNITIVE APPROACH
A crucial explanatory factor underlying the exclusive jurisdiction of the EUMR over tacitly collusive oligopolies resides in the premise that the ex post, corrective instruments enshrined in Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU cannot adequately regulate this area of concern. This is allegedly due to the perceived fact that addressing tacit collusion through the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU would entail punishing in an unwarranted manner what constitutes a purely rational course of conduct. 270 Espousing this conventional belief, the Commission has refrained from applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU on oligopolistic markets and has focused its enforcement resources on preventing the emergence of procollusive oligopolies through the careful monitoring of industry consolidation under the EUMR. 271 On close examination, the view that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should not be applied to purely rational conduct is, however, puzzling. To the best of our knowledge, the very rationale of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is to eliminate market failures arising from the rational behaviour of market players. Firms engage in anticompetitive conduct, abusive tying or refusals to deal, for example, because they view such courses of action as rational, profit-maximizing strategies. Moreover, oligopolists that tacitly collude deliberately choose to follow the others' commercial conduct. 272 Of course, one may legitimately question whether oligopolists should be sanctioned, pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, for what constitutes mere rational adaptation to the others' conduct. 273 Whilst, from a common sense perspective, such question is probably to be answered in the negative, this argument does not eschew the overall applicability of these provisions. In this context, one may for instance think of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU on a no fault basis, through the recognition that absent a wilful intention to restrict competition, oligopolists should enjoy immunity from fines. 274 In order to correct the market failure, the Commission would nonetheless remain entitled to impose remedies (behavioural or structural), pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, or negotiate commitments pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. 275 The Commission could, for example, draw inspiration from the wellknown "State compulsion doctrine" (known in the US under the expression "Act of State defence") and devise a similar, yet distinct, "oligopolistic compulsion doctrine".
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Since the oligopolists' conduct is dictated by the market's intrinsic structure (and other endogenous features, e.g. transparency) it is submitted that they should not be subject to penalties. 
THE EUMR ADEQUATELY PREVENTS THE EMERGENCE OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE
A second, possible reason in support of the EUMR's jurisdictional monopoly over situations of collective dominance lies in the belief that the Regulation's scope of application is sufficiently extensive as to prevent markets from blossoming into tacitly collusive outcomes.
In our opinion, any such view clearly accords the EUMR too much credit as far as its ability to prevent the appearance of tacitly collusive oligopolies is concerned. The jurisdictional scope of the Regulation, as defined in Articles 1 and 3, only encompasses external growth strategies in the form of mergers, acquisitions of control . 277 Yet, unlike in the State compulsion doctrine, only the penalty should be rendered inapplicable. The applicability of the competition rules should, however, be maintained. It ought to be noted here that the applicability of the State compulsion doctrine does not preclude, in practice, the risk that the tacitly colluding oligopolists could be found liable for damages in the context of follow-on actions before ordinary courts. However, they may be able to benefit from the recognition of a form of "force majeure" under tort rules.
and joint ventures. In so doing, the EUMR inevitably fails to apprehend a number of market developments which significantly contribute to market concentration and, in turn, may create or strengthen tacitly collusive equilibriums. This is firstly the case with regard to firms' internal (or organic) growth strategies, which may lead to the creation, or the strengthening of anticompetitive oligopolies. 278 Put simply, the economic theory behind this is as follows: in the competitive process less efficient operators yield business to more efficient undertakings. In order to serve those customers which they manage to wrest from the former, the latter expand their scale of production through internal investments (internal growth). In the mid term, less efficient operators are forced from the market. The market eventually reaches a state of maturity with the appearance of a small number of large, entrenched firms. Those oligopolists subsequently find themselves in a position where they can cease competing, and adopt profitable, passive commercial strategies. In practice, many sectors, such as retail distribution, tyres, or professional software have experienced a significant level of oligopolistic concentration through internal growth. In MCI/WorldCom/Sprint, the Commission acknowledged this issue by noting that a collective dominant position may have been created prior to the notified merger following the exit of a number of players from the market.
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This is secondly the case with regard to a myriad of additional -often overlooked -market practices which may turn a competitive oligopoly into a tacitly collusive one. 280 For example, contractual "meet and release" clauses (also known as "English" clauses), 281 "Most Favoured Customer" clauses, 282 minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates, 283 basic point pricing systems, 284 etc. may also significantly contribute to the emergence of collective dominant positions on the market. The same holds true with regard to a number of other "facilitating" measures adopted by public institutions, including competition authorities and regulators. 285 This is, for instance, the case with measures adopted by sector specific regulators, which compel market players to observe price caps or to disclose information on their pricing policy. In increasing price transparency, such measures facilitate the surveillance activities within the oligopoly, thereby supporting the emergence of tacitly collusive market outcomes.
From the foregoing it is clear that collective dominant positions do not only result from external growth strategies, but may equally arise as a corollary of other business practices, which the EUMR does not, and indeed cannot, regulate. Whilst this article does not submit that the scope of the Regulation should be extended to cover such strategies, it nonetheless stresses that, contrary to a widely held belief, the EUMR does not, and cannot to the exclusion of other legal instruments, fully prevent the emergence of tacitly collusive oligopolies. 286 Furthermore, in oligopolistic markets which are not subject to a significant level of merger activity, situations of tacit collusion may well appear, develop and become consolidated for a significant period of time without the applicability of the EUMR being triggered until a structural change has occurred on the market. In such circumstances, the Regulation fails entirely to prevent a situation of tacit collusion and, absent any ex post enforcement policy, such market failure indefinitely benefits from a state of provisional immunity. 
THE COMMISSION CAN PREDICT THE EMERGENCE OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANT POSITIONS ON THE BASIS OF ECONOMIC THEORY
A third possible misconception is that competition authorities, the Commission in particular, can safely predict the emergence of collective dominance. This idea draws on the intuition that modern industrial organization theory provides robust and practical economic tools for anticipating situations of tacit collusion.
Again, however, this intuition fails to reflect the complexity and nuances of modern industrial organization theory. Of course, a consensus would appear to exist amongst economists (and lawyers) on the very core analytical framework to be used in order to establish collective dominance. 288 In particular, most economists agree that four cumulative elements, in accordance with the GC's case law and the Commission's Guidelines, must be identified for tacit collusion to occur, i.e. mutual understanding of the terms of coordination; ability of oligopolists to detect cheating behaviour; availability of retaliatory instruments; and absence of countervailing power of rivals, and other economic partners. However, economists tend to consider that the theory of tacit collusion provides a very fragile basis upon which decision makers may predict the future. As noted previously by Nobel Prize winner G. Stigler, "with oligopoly, virtually everything is possible".
289 This is because a gulf subsists between opposing sets of economists as regards the effect that relevant market conditions produce on the abovementioned four conditions. To take but a few examples, the existence of capacity constraints certainly prevents an oligopolist from cheating in the first place, and thereby facilitates tacit collusion. 290 Simultaneously, however, the existence of capacity constraints is often deemed to neutralize the threat of retaliation.
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A similar ambiguous, complex effect can be ascribed to so-called "multi-market contact". When oligopolists are active on several distinct markets, they are able to punish deviations on a wider range of sectors, a consequence of which is that the deterrent effect of any punishment increases. As a result, multi-market contacts are deemed to facilitate tacit collusion. 292 Yet, other economists stress the fact that when oligopolists are active on several markets, retaliating on several markets is extremely costly. 293 In addition, in such a situation, an oligopolist may have increased incentives to cheat, in the hope of reaping profits not only on one market, but also on the other markets on which it is active. Finally, demand growth is also a notoriously ambiguous market characteristic.
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Some economists contend that it prevents tacit collusion because oligopolists have strong incentives to engage in cut-throat competition in order to capture new customers. 295 In addition, demand growth could trigger market entry which, in turn, undermines the potential for tacit collusion. 296 This being said, other economists argue that faced with demand growth, oligopolists are increasingly likely to collude.
297 This is because oligopolists have no incentives to engage in price competition strategies in the short run for fear of undermining their joint ability to coordinate prices in the future.
Because many market characteristics may either facilitate (pro-collusive effect) or undermine (anti-collusive effect) tacit collusion, it is almost impossible for competition authorities to prospectively determine (absent ex post evidence) which of those effects will prevail. In other words, the decision that a given market characteristic will lead to one type of effect rather than another invariably involves a certain degree of over-generalization and arbitrariness.
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This problem is further compounded by the fact that the risks of tacit collusion may be influenced by other unobservable variables. Regardless of economic profitmaximization considerations, the psychological, social and historical background of the oligopolists may influence their decision to adhere to a tacitly collusive equilibrium. 299 For instance, these firms may be particularly prone to acting in parallel because their CEOs have been educated together and thus share strong cultural bonds. In the same vein, an irrational competitor may decide to cheat regardless of the risk of costly punishment, simply because it wishes to maintain its reputation as a hard discount player on the market. Finally, in merger control proceedings involving tacit collusion there is an additional hurdle. Because a situation of collective dominance entails the cooperation of most, if not all, players on the market, the Commission must not confine itself to investigating the merging parties, but also extend its inquiries to their rivals. In particular, it must collect information on their costs, investment, pricing strategies, etc. This implies that in collective dominance cases the Commission must in reality conduct an investigation which is tantamount to a broad and burdensome "sector inquiry". However, unlike under Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003, 300 such sector inquiry must be carried out within the tight time limits provided for in the EUMR. Though perhaps a trite observation, any such investigation is likely to prove extremely difficult for the Commission.
Despite recent papers suggesting the contrary, the Commission's recent decisional practice bears testimony to the difficulties of proving tacit collusion in merger cases. 301 In recent years, the Commission has erred on the side of caution and promoted a "low-profile" enforcement policy. Since the Airtours judgment, 302 the Commission has only scrutinized the risks of tacit collusion/collective dominance/ coordinated effects in 11 cases. 303 The staggering number (95 in total) of collective dominance-related decisions adopted by the Commission between 1989 and the Airtours judgment, a period during which the evidentiary burden on the Commission was considerably lower, puts the Commission's enforcement activity since Airtours into perspective. In addition, in a not insignificant number of those cases, the Commission has seemed incapable of proving the initial collective dominance concerns identified in its Statement of Objections. The Commission 
trade between Member States, the rigidity of prices or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or distorted within the common market, the Commission may conduct its inquiry into a particular sector of the economy or into a particular type of agreements across various sectors. In the course of that inquiry, the Commission may request the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to supply the information necessary for giving effect to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and may carry out any inspections necessary for that purpose. The Commission may in particular request the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to communicate to it all agreements, decisions and concerted practices. The Commission may publish a report on the results of its inquiry into particular sectors of the economy or particular types of agreements across various sectors and invite comments from interested parties".

THE SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE ARE SOUND AND WELL-SETTLED
A fourth possible misconception consists in believing that the EUMR's jurisdictional monopoly over tacit collusion is legitimate because the merger control regime is grounded upon a high degree of legal soundness, maturity and certainty (as opposed to the perceived obscurity and novelty of the concept of abuse of a collective dominant position under Article 102 TFEU).
In the authors' opinion, there is a distinct want of merit in the contention that the dust has settled as far as the legal standards underpinning collective dominance are concerned. 310 Airtours v. Commission and the Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers ("the Guidelines") 311 indeed ushered in an increased degree of legal clarity, with the laying down of four cumulative conditions for a finding of collective dominance. The recent rulings handed down by the GC and the Court of Justice of the EU ("CJ", formerly the "ECJ") in Impala v. Commission have, however, muddied the waters regarding the application of those standards. 312 In Impala, which concerned a proposed joint venture between Sony and BMG in recorded music markets, the GC explicitly, albeit in an obiter dictum, undermined the relevance of the four cumulative conditions set out in Airtours v. Commission and in the Guidelines on horizontal mergers. At paragraph 251 of its judgment, the GC declared that: 314 Such pronouncements -the interpretation of which remains keenly disputed by legal scholars -315 are obviously unfortunate from the standpoint of legal certainty. Whilst, of course, the four demanding Airtours conditions had raised the evidentiary burden imposed on the Commission in merger proceedings -and allowed parties to discredit in their entirety tacit collusion theories of harm by simply proving the absence of one condition -those conditions provided a clear, comprehensive legal framework for the assessment of collective dominance. a collective dominant position can be inferred from mere observations of price uniformity, supra-competitive profits and other empirical data suffers from the very obvious flaw that correlation does not imply causation. 317 Situations of price uniformity may appear, for instance, in mature markets where technology and costs remain constant when operators price at marginal cost as a result of fierce competition in the market. Similarly, in a model of so-called COURNOT competition, which leads to price equilibriums situated between marginal costspricing and monopoly pricing, oligopolists may achieve supra-competitive profits absent tacit collusion. 318 Furthermore, in markets where scale matters, large incumbent oligopolists may enjoy generous margins simply because they are very efficient.
Rather, we believe that the aforementioned principle may lead to a risk of decisional abuse. The Commission may, by rigidly adhering to such standard, reserve to itself the ability to freely brush aside and disregard key tenets of economic theory in order to reach findings of collective dominance. For instance, it may rely on the fact that the parties' prices have followed a similar evolution, and pay no heed to the fact that the market is not sufficiently transparent to harbour a situation of tacit collusion.
A similar analysis applies to retaliation, which represented a core issue in the Airtours case. The level of vehemence of any retaliatory measure required to discourage cheating and, in turn, give rise to a situation of collective dominance remains unclear. The relevant guidelines in this respect are couched in rather loose terms, a consequence of which is that the Commission is accorded a significant margin of discretion in this context. In a footnote, the Guidelines consider that: Yet, this contention is disputed in economic theory. Whilst it is conventionally accepted that retaliation must be such that it is able to cancel out the profits achieved through a cheating strategy, 320 economists are generally loath to hold that the mere risk of a return to the competitive equilibrium is sufficient to constitute a retaliatory mechanism. Depending on the circumstances, tacit collusion may only be sustainable if the oligopolists have the ability and incentives to retaliate through, for instance, below-costs pricing strategies (i.e. predatory pricing).
"The expectation that coordination may break down for a certain period of time, if a deviation is identified as such, may in itself constitute a sufficient deterrent mechanism."
Finally, the Guidelines primarily focus on the factors that facilitate tacit collusion, and thus paint a grim picture of the effects that mergers may have on the likelihood of its occurrence. 321 In so doing, the Guidelines fail to reflect the current state of economic thinking in the literature, which equally insists on those factors which hinder tacit collusion. This is true in two particular respects. First, the Guidelines are silent on a number of market features which exert ambivalent effects on tacit collusion. For example, the document disregards a number of factors (e.g. overcapacities, capacity constraints, demand growth, demand inelasticity, network effects, etc.), which all produce contrasting effects on tacit collusion. Second, the document alludes to certain economic parameters in so far as they have a positive effect on the risks of collective dominance, but rather remarkably remain silent on the parallel, undermining effect which such parameters may produce. For instance, multi-market contacts are only referred to as facilitating retaliation, with no reference being made to the fact that they may increase profits pursuant to a cheating strategy (and increase the costs of retaliation). 322 Third, and aside from the confused state of affairs resulting from the Impala rulings, the Airtours case and the Guidelines leave many technical and substantive issues unanswered. It remains for instance open to question whether, in order to establish a situation of tacit collusion, the Commission must prove that retaliation will be specifically targeted at the cheating firm (through, for instance, target rebates, price discrimination in favour of the cheating undertaking's customers, other exclusionary and boycott tactics), or whether it is sufficient to prove a risk of general retaliation through market-wide price reductions. Again, relying on the mere observation of untargeted retaliation to establish collective dominance has given rise to criticism. Indeed, in such situations a punishing firm may cause other oligopolists to incur costs, and may as a result expose itself to the risk of retaliatory measures at a later stage. 323 In order to avoid this in the first place, the punishing firm may simply forgo the opportunity to enforce the retaliatory mechanism. In other words, the inability of oligopolists to specifically target retaliatory measures may jeopardize all future prospects of effective punishment and, as a corollary, impede the emergence of tacitly collusive strategies.
Similarly, a number of uncertainties arise as regards the issue of whether all oligopolists must be in a position to retaliate, and indeed be likely to do so, for collective dominance to occur. The Guidelines indicate rather laconically that "The credibility of the deterrence mechanism depends on whether the other coordinating firms have an incentive to retaliate (emphasis added)". 324 Unless the Commission can anticipate which firm is likely to cheat, and subsequently focus only on the other players' ability to retaliate, there are solid grounds for believing that the Commission should consider each and every market player's ability to punish a cheating strategy.
REMEDIES NEGOTIATED UNDER THE EUMR APTLY ALLAY COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE CONCERNS
A final mistaken belief is that, once a risk of collective dominance has been identified, the Commission could appropriately assuage any tacit collusion concerns by requiring the parties to offer structural remedies as a quid pro quo for a conditional clearance decision. A few years ago, one of the authors of this article conducted a survey which demonstrated that 54 percent of the remedies negotiated by the Commission with a relevant party in collective dominance cases consisted in creating a new, external competitive entity on the market (through structural divestitures, for instance), which could compete with the incumbent oligopolists. By contrast, 40 percent of the remedies consisted in the severance of internal links between oligopolists (joint ventures, etc.).
Contrary to this conventional view, we believe that the structural remedies negotiated by the Commission with the merging parties may generate perverse effects, and in particular, may further exacerbate the risks of tacit collusion. As far as the first type of remedy is concerned -i.e. the creation of a new competitive entity on the market -the Commission has often requested incumbent oligopolists to transfer relevant assets. Such measures, which normally fall beyond the scope of the Commission's oversight capabilities (they are implemented by the parties and trustees) imply a potential risk of secret, arm's length collaboration between the incumbent oligopolists and the new entrant. As a result, one cannot exclude that a vendor will seek to induce the acquirer to join the tacitly collusive oligopoly. As explained by Professor Farrell: "[a]gencies should beware of over-trusting the buyer of the divested assets. A strong argument can be made that the buyer is a team-mate not of the agency but of the merging parties".
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In practice, the US Federal Trade Commission has found empirical evidence of this problem in two merger cases.
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In the same vein, whilst a divestiture of assets to a new entrant will in theory undermine collective dominance by increasing the number of firms active on the market, it may simultaneously increase the degree of symmetry between the incumbent oligopolists and thus indirectly encourage tacit collusive dynamics. This risk is particularly acute when the proposed merger entails the creation of an asymmetric oligopoly where the collusive outcome takes the form of price leadership. 327 Whilst the divestiture of assets may well erode the price leader's market share, it may concomitantly increase the symmetry of market shares held by the relevant oligopolists. The remedy may thus fall into the trap of simply bringing about a change in the nature of collusion.
As far as the second type of remedy is concerned -i.e. the severance of internal links between oligopolists -they are likely to be ineffective because the Commission's powers under the EUMR can exclusively bear on the "undertakings concerned", i.e. those participating in the concentration. 328 In contrast to Article 101 TFEU, the Commission cannot request third parties (firms that are for instance linked to the merged oligopolist) to sever commercial, industrial, and other financial links. In practice, this means that the ability of the merging parties to enforce a proposed commitment will ultimately depend on the goodwill of third parties. Moreover, because the implementation of the merger might be conditional on the attendant implementation of the relevant remedy, third parties may be in a position to hold the merging parties hostage in order to extract significant financial compensation, etc. Finally, it ought to be remarked that such remedies are, ex hypothesi, unavailable in cases of pure tacit collusion (i.e. collusion absent structural, or commercial links). 329 
CONCLUSION
The current "monopoly" position occupied by the EUMR vis-à-vis issues pertaining to tacit collusion issues is somewhat paradoxical. Whilst there remains a gulf between opposing sets of economists regarding the real existence of pure, oligopolistic tacit collusion on markets for everyday products/services, 330 the Commission's practice "systematically" scrutinizes the risk of collective dominance arising from oligopolistic mergers on the basis of the EUMR. 331 Whilst we believe that, from a resource-based perspective, the cost of testing all oligopolistic mergers on the grounds of potential collective dominance concerns is likely to be high, the Commission seems to believe that it is lower than the cost attributable to the allegedly complex and cumbersome system of ex post monitoring under Article 102 EC. 332 This cost-benefit perspective, however, is not based on any empirical evidence. In addition, it fails entirely to factor in the huge costs which may result from erroneous ex ante predictions under the EUMR.
In addition, such a systematic, preventive approach is problematic for a number of reasons. Exclusive reliance on the EUMR in order to abate tacit collusion concerns fails first to apprehend certain market constellations which arise from organic growth strategies. 333 Second, it imposes unwarranted informational and procedural burdens on oligopolistic firms. Third, and more fundamentally, it increases the risk of decisional errors because of the flaws in the economic theory on which the Commission relies and the short deadlines within which it is required to predict future occurrences. Finally, it does not reflect the very economic idea that tacit collusion is, in so far as its effects are concerned, almost as damaging as a hardcore horizontal cartel. As a result, competition authorities should arguably use the full range of their legal weaponry to dissolve tacitly collusive equilibriums and not close the door to ex post enforcement actions.
